A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining

DOI10.2307/1911733MaRDI QIDQ3714932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alvin E. Roth

Publication date 1985

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911733

zbMATH Keywords

effect of risk aversionnoncooperative model of multiperiod bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
• Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining
• Nash bargaining and risk aversion
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Cited in

(20)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3970421 (Why is no real title available?)
• Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
• INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
• On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
• A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
• Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
• The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
• Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining
• Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game
• A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
• Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources
• Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes
• Nash bargaining and risk aversion
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion
• On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining
• Firm's protection against disasters: are investment and insurance substitutes or complements?
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion

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