A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
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Recommendations
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
- Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game
- Time preferences and bargaining
- An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting
Cites work
- A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs
- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- Cycles and instability in a rock-paper-scissors population game: a continuous time experiment
- Delay in bargaining games with complete information
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- The bargaining problem
- Time horizon and cooperation in continuous time
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
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