Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown

DOI10.1007/BF00134151MaRDI QIDQ1193766zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Rami Zwick, Amnon Rapoport, John C. Howard

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites work

• Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
• On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon

Cited in

(6)

• Bargaining and boldness
• Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
• Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity: an experimental study
• The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management
• INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
• A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time

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