INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING

DOI10.1111/boer.12156zbMath1411.91257OpenAlexW2801123788WikidataQ129937616 ScholiaQ129937616MaRDI QIDQ4629502

Karl H. Schlag, Stefan Kohler

Publication date: 27 March 2019

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40764/1/MPRA_paper_40764.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessbehavioral economicsbargaining powerequitybargainingnegotiationsocial preferencesguiltenvyalternating offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types

Cites Work

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• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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