INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
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Publication:4629502
DOI10.1111/boer.12156zbMath1411.91257OpenAlexW2801123788WikidataQ129937616 ScholiaQ129937616MaRDI QIDQ4629502
Publication date: 27 March 2019
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40764/1/MPRA_paper_40764.pdf
fairnessbehavioral economicsbargaining powerequitybargainingnegotiationsocial preferencesguiltenvyalternating offers
Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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