A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
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Publication:1804014
DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1004zbMATH Open0792.90021OpenAlexW2047232618MaRDI QIDQ1804014FDOQ1804014
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1004
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Cited In (29)
- Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining
- Continuous-time stochastic games
- Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
- Walrasian bargaining.
- Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
- Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication.
- Strategic bargaining with firm inventories
- Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
- Delay in trade networks
- Continuous-time games of timing
- A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
- Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
- A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money
- Strategic choice of waiting and reaction times in bargaining
- Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Hiding and herding in market entry
- A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers
- Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing
- A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
- UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
- Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
- On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty
- Personal power dynamics in bargaining
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