Hiding and herding in market entry
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Publication:2682015
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105568zbMATH Open1506.91087OpenAlexW4306179841MaRDI QIDQ2682015FDOQ2682015
Authors: Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert
Publication date: 31 January 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105568
Recommendations
entryexperimentationmarket competitioncommon valueshiding and herdinguncertain and irreversible costs
Cites Work
- Investment timing and learning externalities
- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
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- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- Strategic Experimentation
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- Optimal entry timing
- Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
- Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
- Breakdowns
- Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
- Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
- Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
- Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
- Strategic investment and learning with private information
- Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
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