Hiding and herding in market entry

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105568zbMath1506.91087OpenAlexW4306179841MaRDI QIDQ2682015

Steffen Lippert, Simona Fabrizi, Francis Bloch

Publication date: 31 January 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105568

zbMATH Keywords

entrycommon valuesexperimentationmarket competitionhiding and herdinguncertain and irreversible costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Optimal entry timing
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
• Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
• Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
• Strategic investment and learning with private information
• Learning and Information Aggregation in an Exit Game
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Strategic Experimentation
• Breakdowns
• Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems

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