Hiding and herding in market entry

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105568MaRDI QIDQ2682015zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

Publication date 31 January 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105568

zbMATH Keywords

entryexperimentationmarket competitioncommon valueshiding and herdinguncertain and irreversible costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
• Optimal entry timing
• Entry deterrence and hidden competition
• Timing of entry under externalities
• Investment decisions under hidden competition

Cites work

• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Breakdowns
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
• Optimal entry timing
• Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
• Strategic Experimentation
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Strategic investment and learning with private information
• Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry

Cited in

(4)

• Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
• Sunk costs, entry and clustering
• Optimal entry timing
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

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