Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
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Publication:969122
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.12.001zbMath1238.91079OpenAlexW2138295278MaRDI QIDQ969122
Giuseppe Moscarini, Francesco Squintani
Publication date: 11 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.12.001
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (9)
Strategic investment and learning with private information ⋮ The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning ⋮ Optimal entry timing ⋮ Hiding and herding in market entry ⋮ Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information ⋮ On games of strategic experimentation ⋮ Undiscounted bandit games ⋮ Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs ⋮ Inefficiency of sponsored research
Cites Work
- Investment timing and learning externalities
- Dynamic games of innovation
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Real options and preemption under incomplete information
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Racing with Uncertainty
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- Experimentation in Markets
- Strategic Experimentation
- Learning and Strategic Pricing
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
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