Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R\&D game with private information

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90043-RMaRDI QIDQ1194259zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Aoki, David Reitman

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90043-r

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionpartial pooling equilibriaR\&D gametwo-sided incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
• Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
• Strategic investment under incomplete information
• Strategic information revelation through real options in investment games
• Dynamic R\& D with strategic behavior

Cites work

• A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
• A note on the strategic adoption of a new technology
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model

Cited in

(6)

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Strategic investment under incomplete information
• Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
• R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
• Strategic R\& D success announcements
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse

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