Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
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Publication:3929351
DOI10.2307/1912637zbMath0474.90016OpenAlexW2140116864WikidataQ56481601 ScholiaQ56481601MaRDI QIDQ3929351
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Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4245.pdf
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