Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007zbMath1283.91032OpenAlexW3123726008MaRDI QIDQ2437846

Wieland Müller, Fangfang Tan

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

experimentdiscontinuity effectgroups versus individualsStackelberg market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (4)

The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships: an experimental study ⋮ Representing others in a public good game ⋮ Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
• Exploring group decision making in a power-to-take experiment
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Revealed Altruism
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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