Exploring group decision making in a power-to-take experiment
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Publication:2499522
DOI10.1007/s10683-006-4310-9zbMath1132.91368OpenAlexW2103031984MaRDI QIDQ2499522
Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Ronald Bosman, Frans van Winden
Publication date: 14 August 2006
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-4310-9
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