Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach
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Publication:1735802
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.01.003zbMATH Open1419.91176OpenAlexW2909996368MaRDI QIDQ1735802FDOQ1735802
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1606426/0119IndividualMui.pdf
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Cites Work
- Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
- Social influence in the sequential dictator game
- Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon
- Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*
- Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
- Group cooperation under uncertainty
- Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
- Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
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