Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2017-0058OpenAlexW2905606373MaRDI QIDQ2098986

Adele Whelan

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0058

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceconsumption externalitycoordinating advertisinglimit advertising

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (1)

Platform responses to entry in a local market with mobile providers

Cites Work

• A model of repeat advertising
• Signaling advertising by multiproduct firms
• Oligopolistic pricing and advertising
• Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Informative Price Advertising in a Sequential Search Model

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