Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00279-7zbMATH Open0945.91012OpenAlexW2085774271MaRDI QIDQ1978779FDOQ1978779

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00279-7

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zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand competitioninformative advertisingmixed-strategy equilibriumstrategic entry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices

Cited In (11)

• Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities
• Strategic advertising: the fat-cat effect and stability
• Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repetitive advertising to deter entry.
• Pricing and alliance selection for a dominant retailer with an upstream entry
• Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Note on self-restraint as an online entry-deterrence strategy
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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