Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00279-7MaRDI QIDQ1978779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00279-7

zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand competitioninformative advertisingmixed-strategy equilibriumstrategic entry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

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(13)

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• The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence
• A note on increasing returns to advertising
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Note on self-restraint as an online entry-deterrence strategy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841903 (Why is no real title available?)

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