Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence

DOI10.2307/2297444zbMATH Open0618.90011OpenAlexW2086637488MaRDI QIDQ3755190FDOQ3755190

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno 

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297444

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zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrencelocational choiceproduct specificationproduct proliferationsub-game perfect equilibriathreat of entrythree-stage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (15)

• Quality and entry deterrence
• Competitive spatial models
• The concept of the undercut-proof equilibrium in multistage games
• Advertising in a dynamic spatial monopoly
• Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly
• Quality investment, and the contract manufacturer's encroachment
• Spatial competition with entry deterrence considering horizontal product differentiations
• Timing of entry and location/product differentiation
• Market size, competition, and entrepreneurs' location choices
• Monopoly rents in contestable markets
• Note on self-restraint as an online entry-deterrence strategy
• Piracy as an entry deterrence strategy in software market
• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Capital accumulation for production in a dynamic spatial monopoly
• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game

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