Piracy as an entry deterrence strategy in software market
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Publication:2076829
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Cites work
- Bundling information goods: pricing, profits, and efficiency
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- Free trial or no free trial: optimal software product design with network effects
- Information goods vs. industrial goods: cost structure and competition
- Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
- Multiple Market Entry, Cost Signalling and Entry Deterrence
- Note on self-restraint as an online entry-deterrence strategy
- Optimal bundling of technological products with network externality
- Pricing and alliance selection for a dominant retailer with an upstream entry
- Quality and entry deterrence
- Quality investment, and the contract manufacturer's encroachment
- Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades
- Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier
- Versioning and Piracy Control for Digital Information Goods
Cited in
(4)- Can piracy lead to higher prices in the music and motion picture industries?
- Impacts of gray market selling on the supply chain under product upgrade and pricing flexibility decisions
- Presence of piracy and legal protection: decisions in the digital goods market under different contracts
- Optimal contract selection considering the entry of a new supplier
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