A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.09.005MaRDI QIDQ2444161zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takeshi Murooka

Publication date 8 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceproduct differentiationspatial preemption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Spatial competition with entry deterrence considering horizontal product differentiations
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

Cited in

(6)

• Spatial competition with entry deterrence considering horizontal product differentiations
• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Note on self-restraint as an online entry-deterrence strategy
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets
• First mover advantage by product proliferation in multiproduct duopoly

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