Spatial competition with entry deterrence considering horizontal product differentiations

DOI10.1155/2013/426345MaRDI QIDQ1789906zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ai-Nong Zhou

Publication date 10 October 2018

Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/426345

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Review text

Summary: Spatial competition plays important roles in economics, which attracts extensive research. This paper addresses spatial competitions along with horizontal product differentiations and entry deterrence. By the dynamic game theory model about one firm and a potential entrant with different cost in a linear city, this paper finds that both the higher fixed setup cost and the higher transportation cost deter entrants. To efficiently deter the entrants, the establisher is inclined to locating at the middle point of the linear city.

Recommendations

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Cited in

(2)

• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

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