Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly

DOI10.1007/S00712-022-00790-YMaRDI QIDQ2081097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sawoong Kang, Jeong-Yoo Kim

Publication date 12 October 2022

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00790-y

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrencemixed duopolysocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem

Cites work

• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
• Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
• Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct firms
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

Cited in

(2)

• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

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