Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence (Q3755190)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003856
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| English | Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003856 |
Statements
Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence (English)
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1987
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threat of entry
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product proliferation
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product specification
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locational choice
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sub-game perfect equilibria
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three-stage game
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entry deterrence
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0.7931690812110901
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0.7729061245918274
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0.7678365111351013
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0.7641022205352783
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''It has often been claimed in the literature (see... Schmalensee (1978)) that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise... However, no satisfactory proof of this claim has been given so far.'' The purpose of the paper is to show ''that entry deterrance, although optimal, need not be achieved through product proliferation''. The incumbent monopolist may instead choose to deter from entry by product specification. This is demonstrated by an example based on Hotelling's (1929) model of locational choice (quadratic transportation cost, positive set-up cost for each ''store'' (brand), finite reservation price). The author looks at the sub-game perfect equilibria of \textit{R. Selten} [Int. J. Game Theory 4, 25-55 (1975; Zbl 0312.90072)] of a three-stage game between an incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant. ''In stage 1 the incumbent decides how many ''stores'' to open and where to locate them. In stage 2 the potential entrant (having observed the action taken by the incumbent) decides whether to enter or not and - if he decides to enter - where to locate his store. Finally, in stage 3 incumbent and entrant compete in prices.'' ''The main result is that entry deterrence is indeed optimal, but it need not be achieved through product proliferation. In fact, for some values of the parameters, the number of stores opened by the incumbent at the unique perfect equilibrium of the game is equal to the number opened by a protected monopolist who does not face the threat of entry, but the locations of these stores are different. This can be interpreted as an entry-deterring strategy based on product specification (or location choice) as opposed to product proliferation.'' (Quotations from the introduction.)
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