Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising

DOI10.2298/YJOR1102163KMaRDI QIDQ4903385zbMATHFDO

Authors Marija Kuzmanović, Milan Martić, Vera Kovačević-Vujčić

Publication date 21 January 2013

Published in Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

advertisingmarket equilibriumstrategic investmententry deterrenceover-investmententry accommodation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model
• Persuasive advertising under Bertrand competition: A differential game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859310
• Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach
• Repetitive advertising to deter entry.

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859310 (Why is no real title available?)
• Repetitive advertising to deter entry.
• Strategic advertising: the fat-cat effect and stability
• Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities

This page was built for publication: Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4903385)