Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising

DOI10.2298/YJOR1102163KzbMATH Open1265.91002MaRDI QIDQ4903385FDOQ4903385

Authors: Marija Kuzmanović, Milan Martić, Vera Kovačević-Vujčić 

Publication date: 21 January 2013

Published in: Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

advertisingmarket equilibriumstrategic investmententry deterrenceover-investmententry accommodation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (4)

• Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities
• Strategic advertising: the fat-cat effect and stability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repetitive advertising to deter entry.

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