Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0030-2zbMATH Open1161.91377OpenAlexW2025673253MaRDI QIDQ1018034FDOQ1018034
Authors: Rupayan Pal, B. C. Saha
Publication date: 13 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document1622008520.7070429.pdf&fcategory=Articles&AId=1375&fref=repec
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
- Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
- The codetermined firm in oligopoly
- Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India
Cited In (6)
- Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly
- Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
- Validity of the ``principle of maximum product differentiation in a unionized mixed-duopoly
- Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
- Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining
- Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
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