Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
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Cites work
- Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
- The codetermined firm in oligopoly
- Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
Cited in
(6)- Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
- Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
- Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining
- Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
- Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly
- Validity of the ``principle of maximum product differentiation in a unionized mixed-duopoly
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