Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90021-LzbMath0754.90020OpenAlexW2047310917MaRDI QIDQ1196652

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90021-l

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg leaderBayesian perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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