Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90021-LMaRDI QIDQ1196652zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry Green

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90021-l

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian perfect equilibriaStackelberg leader

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
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• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(6)

• How risk disciplines pre-commitment
• Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1264446 (Why is no real title available?)
• Signaling private choices
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859309 (Why is no real title available?)
• Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment

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