On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1745663
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.01.001zbMath1388.91120OpenAlexW3125114651MaRDI QIDQ1745663
Publication date: 18 April 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01285190/file/WP%201608_version02.pdf
Related Items
Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection, On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets, Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
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