A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
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Publication:5420146
DOI10.1111/iere.12054zbMath1294.91035OpenAlexW2144874596MaRDI QIDQ5420146
Publication date: 11 June 2014
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18471.pdf
Games in extensive form (91A18) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (13)
An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance ⋮ Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans ⋮ A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection ⋮ Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
Cites Work
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- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
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