A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection

DOI10.1111/IERE.12054MaRDI QIDQ5420146zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nick Netzer, Florian Scheuer

Publication date 11 June 2014

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w18471.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
• Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information

Cites work

• A law of large numbers for large economies
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
• Informational Equilibrium
• Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

Cited in

(19)

• A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
• Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance
• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
• An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
• An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
• Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
• Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
• Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
• A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
• Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
• ON THE GAME‐THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*
• Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans
• Employer credit checks: poverty traps versus matching efficiency
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

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