A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
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Publication:5420146
DOI10.1111/IERE.12054zbMATH Open1294.91035OpenAlexW2144874596MaRDI QIDQ5420146FDOQ5420146
Authors: Nick Netzer, Florian Scheuer 
Publication date: 11 June 2014
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18471.pdf
Recommendations
- Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
- Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
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- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- A law of large numbers for large economies
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- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- Informational Equilibrium
- A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
- General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
- A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
- On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling
- Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
Cited In (18)
- Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
- An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
- A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
- A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
- Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
- Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans
- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
- An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
- Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
- Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
- Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
- Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
- ON THE GAME‐THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*
- Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
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