Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection

DOI10.2307/1913244MaRDI QIDQ3755195zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 1987

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913244

zbMATH Keywords

screeningexistenceuniquenessasymmetric informationsignallingself-selectioninformational equilibriuminformational consistencyreactive equilibrium concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(12)

• A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
• Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
• A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
• Upper semi-continuity of the separating equilibrium correspondence
• Competitive equilibrium with unawareness in economies with production
• (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance
• Robust matching for teams
• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection

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