Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
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Publication:3755195
DOI10.2307/1913244zbMath0618.90017OpenAlexW2042897887MaRDI QIDQ3755195
No author found.
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913244
existenceuniquenessasymmetric informationscreeningsignallingself-selectioninformational equilibriuminformational consistencyreactive equilibrium concept
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