Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.002zbMath1330.91128OpenAlexW2071706818MaRDI QIDQ896942

Christoph Schottmüller

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

screeningSpence-Mirrlees conditionglobal incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
• Pre-sale information
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
• Monopoly and product quality
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
• Incentive Problems With Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A Unified Approach
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Convex Programming and Duality in Normed Space

This page was built for publication: Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions