Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.002zbMATH Open1330.91128OpenAlexW2071706818MaRDI QIDQ896942FDOQ896942

Authors: Christoph Schottmüller 

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.002

Recommendations

• Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
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• Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions
• Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection
• Adverse selection with heterogeneously informed agents
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection

zbMATH Keywords

screeningSpence-Mirrlees conditionglobal incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Monopoly and product quality
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
• Pre-sale information
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
• Convex Programming and Duality in Normed Space
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a unified approach
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
• Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
• The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing

Cited In (7)

• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
• Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: overall distortion and type-partitioning
• Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity imply a bias of screening
• Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

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