Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0481-XMaRDI QIDQ612002zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nick Netzer, Florian Scheuer

Publication date 3 January 2011

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0481-x

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsmultidimensional screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Welfare economics (91B15) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: implications for equity and efficiency
• Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost
• Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming

Cites work

• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case

Cited in

(7)

• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Risk classification in insurance markets with risk and preference heterogeneity
• Insurance contracts and financial markets
• Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: implications for equity and efficiency

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