Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
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Recommendations
Cited in
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- Competitive markets with private information on both sides
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- Wages as signals of worker mobility
- Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- General equilibrium in markets for lemons
- On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling
- Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard
- General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
- Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
- Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies
- Debt-deflation versus the liquidity trap: the dilemma of nonconventional monetary policy
- A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection
- Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive insurance market under quasilinear preferences
- Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost
- Insurance contracts and financial markets
- Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard
- A quantitative theory of the credit score
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
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