Wages as signals of worker mobility
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Publication:6154190
DOI10.3982/TE4623OpenAlexW4391139397MaRDI QIDQ6154190
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Publication date: 19 March 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4623
private informationlimited commitmentworker mobilitycompetitive search equilibriumwage postingcounteroffers
Cites Work
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- Competing with asking prices
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- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
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- Signalling to Experts
- Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
- Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence
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