Signalling to Experts

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA068zbMATH Open1481.91109OpenAlexW4251173225MaRDI QIDQ5022571FDOQ5022571

Authors: Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer 

Publication date: 19 January 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa068

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zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumasymmetric informationsignalingexpertise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Economics of information (91B44) Labor markets (91B39)

Cited In (16)

• Market signaling with grades
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Wages as signals of worker mobility
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Arithmetics of research specialization
• Strategic dropouts
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Multidimensional signalling
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers

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