Signalling to Experts

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA068MaRDI QIDQ5022571zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer

Publication date 19 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa068

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumasymmetric informationsignalingexpertise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Economics of information (91B44) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226088
• Signaling of information
• Information revelation through signalling
• Rationalizable signaling
• On the signaling problem
• Signalling with Many Signals
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4108655
• On the value of persuasion by experts

Cited in

(16)

• Arithmetics of research specialization
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Multidimensional signalling
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Market signaling with grades
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Wages as signals of worker mobility
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Strategic dropouts
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling

This page was built for publication: Signalling to Experts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5022571)