Signalling to Experts

DOI10.1093/restud/rdaa068zbMath1481.91109OpenAlexW4251173225MaRDI QIDQ5022571

Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer

Publication date: 19 January 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa068

zbMATH Keywords

signalingasymmetric informationcompetitive equilibriumexpertise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Labor markets (91B39)

Related Items (3)

Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Wages as signals of worker mobility

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