Signalling to Experts

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA068MaRDI QIDQ5022571zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer

Publication date 19 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa068

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcompetitive equilibriumexpertisesignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Economics of information (91B44) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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Cited in

(18)

• Multidimensional signalling
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Strategic dropouts
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Arithmetics of research specialization
• Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Wages as signals of worker mobility
• Educational signaling in two different education systems
• Actions and signals
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

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