Education signalling and uncertainty

zbMATH Open0996.91027MaRDI QIDQ2739366FDOQ2739366

Authors: Jürgen Eichberger, D. Kelsey 

Publication date: 9 September 2001

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zbMATH Keywords

signallingDempster-Shafer equilibriumBayes perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (5)

• Non-additive anonymous games
• Continuous-time public good contribution under uncertainty: a stochastic control approach
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals
• Violations of belief persistence in Dempster-Shafer equilibrium

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