Education signaling with uncertain return

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1867MaRDI QIDQ2867487zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tali Regev

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1867

zbMATH Keywords

signalingreturns to education

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(15)

• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Education choices and job market characteristics
• Separating equilibrium and persistent inefficiency
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Market signaling with grades
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• The welfare cost of signaling
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Strategic dropouts

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