Education signaling with uncertain return

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1867zbMATH Open1277.91110OpenAlexW2033005445MaRDI QIDQ2867487FDOQ2867487

Authors: Tali Regev 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1867

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zbMATH Keywords

signalingreturns to education

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (15)

• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• The welfare cost of signaling
• A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems
• Strategic dropouts
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Separating equilibrium and persistent inefficiency
• Education choices and job market characteristics
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers

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