Separating equilibrium and persistent inefficiency

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500107zbMATH Open1258.91038OpenAlexW2021381179MaRDI QIDQ4908592FDOQ4908592

Authors: V. W. Kolpin 

Publication date: 6 March 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500107

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationproductive efficiencyseparating equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent¹

Cited In (3)

• Household Inefficiency and Equilibrium Efficiency
• The Zilcha criteria for dynamic inefficiency reconsidered
• The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

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