Job market signaling and employer learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.018zbMATH Open1247.91027OpenAlexW3023814074MaRDI QIDQ449178FDOQ449178

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Julien Prat

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018

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zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesemployer learningintuitive criterionmultiple pooling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Trees and extensive forms
• Sequential Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Market signaling with grades
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Employer learning and statistical discrimination
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations
• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Learning and Wage Dynamics

Cited In (11)

• Market signaling with grades
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Informative tests in signaling environments
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• EFFICIENT LEARNING AND JOB TURNOVER IN THE LABOR MARKET
• Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Information cascades in the labor market

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