Job market signaling and employer learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.018MaRDI QIDQ449178zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Julien Prat

Publication date 12 September 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesemployer learningintuitive criterionmultiple pooling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48635 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940288 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
• Employer learning and statistical discrimination
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Learning and Wage Dynamics
• Market signaling with grades
• Microeconomic theory
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Trees and extensive forms
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons

Cited in

(19)

• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Market signaling with grades
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• The welfare cost of signaling
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Informative tests in signaling environments
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• EFFICIENT LEARNING AND JOB TURNOVER IN THE LABOR MARKET
• Hiring and firing -- a signaling game
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Asymptotic stability of Bayesian updating for Spencian examples
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Harmful signaling in matching markets
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Information cascades in the labor market

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