The welfare cost of signaling

DOI10.3390/G8010011MaRDI QIDQ725093zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ronald M. Harstad, Fan Yang

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010011

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcostly signalingseparating equilibriumsocial cost of signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Harmful signaling in matching markets
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Market signaling with grades
• Education signaling with uncertain return

Cites work

• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• Microeconomic theory
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(8)

• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight
• Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction
• ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
• Labor mobility under asymmetric information with moving and signalling costs
• Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics

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