Labor mobility under asymmetric information with moving and signalling costs

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90129-1zbMATH Open1328.91167OpenAlexW2082194134WikidataQ126421993 ScholiaQ126421993MaRDI QIDQ899806FDOQ899806

Authors: Eliakim Katz, Oded Stark 

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90129-1

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Labor mobility under asymmetric information with moving and signalling costs

Cited In (5)

• A tale of two markets: labor market mobility and bank information sharing
• Labor mobility under asymmetric information with moving and signalling costs
• Induced global risk preference
• Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market
• Return and Dynamics: The Path of Labor Migration when Workers Differ in Their Skills and Information Is Asymmetric

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