Harmful signaling in matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.04.002MaRDI QIDQ2435902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexey Kushnir

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96837/files/NDL2010-121.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcheap talksignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Varying the number of signals in matching markets
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Cites work

• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Game theory
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(7)

• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• The welfare cost of signaling
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
• Varying the number of signals in matching markets
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling

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