Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics
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Publication:953720
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2003.08.004zbMATH Open1202.91150OpenAlexW2076014513MaRDI QIDQ953720FDOQ953720
Authors: Shaun P. Vahey
Publication date: 6 November 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.08.004
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