Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2003.08.004MaRDI QIDQ953720zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shaun P. Vahey

Publication date 6 November 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

signallingability to payrent sharing dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Commitment and costly signaling in decentralized markets
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• The welfare cost of signaling
• Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences
• Agent-Based Experimental Economics in Signaling Games
• Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
• Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining

Cites work

• Introductory Price as a Signal of Cost in a Model of Repeat Business
• Nonrevelation in Employment Contracts
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

Cited in

(2)

• Rent-sharing, holdup, and wages: evidence from matched panel data
• Rent-sharing and workers' bargaining power: an empirical cross-country/ cross-industry panel analysis

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