A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

DOI10.1007/S001829900024MaRDI QIDQ1972264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Bac

Publication date 26 April 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/25082

zbMATH Keywords

alternating offers bargainingdelayincomplete informationsequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(10)

• Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
• A comment on issue-by-issue negotiations
• Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
• An experiment on the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling in bargaining
• Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference
• On the first-offer dilemma in bargaining and negotiations
• Immediate settlement or enduring a strike: the choice of signals
• Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5251898 (Why is no real title available?)
• Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics

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