An experiment on the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling in bargaining

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0762MaRDI QIDQ1593748zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten

Publication date 25 January 2001

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0762

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining experimentface-to-face interactiontruth-signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation
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Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information

Cited in

(3)

• Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: an experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation
• Non-acceptance of Losses—An Experimental Study on the Importance of the Sign of Final Outcomes in Ultimatum Bargaining
• EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

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