Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment

DOI10.1007/BF02425260zbMath0859.90136OpenAlexW1980850369MaRDI QIDQ2564156

Glenn W. Harrison, Kevin A. McCabe

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02425260

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessrationalityultimatum bargaining experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games