Noisy leadership: An experimental approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.05.004MaRDI QIDQ863265zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors W. Müller, Werner Güth, Yossi Spiegel

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8934e11fbe6f

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentexperimentsimperfect observabilityoligopolysequential gameserrors in communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
• Commitment and observability in games
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
• Equity, efficiency and evolutionary stability in bargaining games with joint production
• Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
• Unobserved Delegation

Cited in

(6)

• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
• Leadership and the effective choice of information regime
• Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree
• hreg

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