Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
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Publication:863265
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.004zbMath1153.91311OpenAlexW3121856501MaRDI QIDQ863265
Wieland Müller, Güth, Werner, Yossef Spiegel
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8934e11fbe6f
Related Items (5)
Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Noisy signaling: theory and experiment ⋮ Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study ⋮ Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance ⋮ From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
Uses Software
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