Noisy leadership: An experimental approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.05.004zbMATH Open1153.91311OpenAlexW3121856501MaRDI QIDQ863265FDOQ863265

Authors: W. Müller, Werner Güth, Yossi Spiegel 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8934e11fbe6f

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentexperimentsimperfect observabilityoligopolysequential gameserrors in communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation
• Commitment and observability in games
• Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
• Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
• Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Equity, efficiency and evolutionary stability in bargaining games with joint production
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

Cited In (6)

• Leadership and the effective choice of information regime
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
• Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree
• hreg

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