Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3647917 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
- Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining
- Strategic delegation in bargaining
- The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Unobserved Delegation
Cited in
(5)- Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives
- On the impact of an intermediary agent in the ultimatum game
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
- When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game
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