Delegation and threat in bargaining

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0611zbMath0909.90282MaRDI QIDQ1268647

Björn Segendorff

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0611

zbMATH Keywords

public good; high-authority equilibrium; low-authority equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91A12: Cooperative games

91B18: Public goods

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers, Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines, Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification, A group bargaining solution, Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining, Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games, The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

Cites Work

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• Strategic delegation in bargaining
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• The Bargaining Problem
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games