Delegation and threat in bargaining

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0611zbMath0909.90282OpenAlexW2082829169MaRDI QIDQ1268647

Björn Segendorff

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0611

zbMATH Keywords

public goodhigh-authority equilibriumlow-authority equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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A group bargaining solution ⋮ Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification ⋮ The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers ⋮ The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision ⋮ Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines ⋮ Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining ⋮ Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

Cites Work

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• Strategic delegation in bargaining
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• The Bargaining Problem
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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