The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0113-yzbMath1239.91055OpenAlexW2000409693MaRDI QIDQ427555

Lenka Stastna, Martin Gregor

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83312

zbMATH Keywords

complementarityspilloverexternalitydecentralization theoremspill-in

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Strategic delegation of environmental policy making
• Delegation and threat in bargaining
• The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
• Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
• Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game

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