Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0056MaRDI QIDQ2099017zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tomoya Tajika

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0056

zbMATH Keywords

inefficiencystrategic delegationquadratic objective functionregular equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) 2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Recommendations

• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
• Repeated delegation
• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
• A commitment folk theorem
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• Bilateral commitment
• Commitment games
• Delegation and threat in bargaining
• Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.

Cited in

(6)

• Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
• Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

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