Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0056OpenAlexW2952856967WikidataQ127669986 ScholiaQ127669986MaRDI QIDQ2099017FDOQ2099017
Authors: Tomoya Tajika 
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0056
Recommendations
History, political science (91F10) 2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
Cites Work
- A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A commitment folk theorem
- Commitment games
- Bilateral commitment
- Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
- The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
- Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
- Delegation and threat in bargaining
- Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
Cited In (6)
- Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
- Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
- Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
- Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case
- On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
- Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
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