Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

DOI10.1515/bejte-2018-0056OpenAlexW2952856967WikidataQ127669986 ScholiaQ127669986MaRDI QIDQ2099017

Tomoya Tajika

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0056

zbMATH Keywords

quadratic objective functioninefficiencystrategic delegationregular equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) History, political science (91F10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (1)

Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• A commitment folk theorem
• Commitment games
• Delegation and threat in bargaining
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• Bilateral commitment
• Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

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