Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
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Publication:3905104
DOI10.2307/1911514zbMath0456.90092OpenAlexW2082546553MaRDI QIDQ3905104
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911514
Nash equilibriumbargainingtwo-person noncooperative gameconstrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocationdevision of n commoditiesdistortion of utilitiesvon Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
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