Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3756277 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- The bargaining problem
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
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