Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0884zbMATH Open1023.91020OpenAlexW2054287605MaRDI QIDQ700129FDOQ700129
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0884
bargaining\(n\)-agent noncooperative gamesdistortion gameinteriority conditionLindahl rulepublic good economyWalrasian rule
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The Bargaining Problem
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
- A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
Cited In (5)
Recommendations
This page was built for publication: Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700129)