Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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Publication:896943
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.014zbMATH Open1330.91109OpenAlexW3125492573MaRDI QIDQ896943FDOQ896943
Authors: Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama 
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014
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Cited In (15)
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Manipulability in school choice
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
- Divide and compromise
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