Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.014MaRDI QIDQ896943zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationNash implementationenvy-freenessindivisible good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(15)

• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• Coalition formation in games of fair division
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• Divide and compromise
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Manipulability in school choice
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

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