Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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Publication:896943
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014zbMath1330.91109OpenAlexW3125492573MaRDI QIDQ896943
Takuma Wakayama, Yuji Fujinaka
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014
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